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11.1  Deferred Wage Payments 
If the State does not provide an adequate system of pensions, it is to be 
expected that employers will provide their workers with  pensions, and 
some do. In a world of full information and perfect markets, private pen- 
sions could be individual contracts by workers with independent insur- 
ance companies. We shall not comment on all the reasons why that does 
not happen. Instead, we consider the forms of private pensions that are 
likely to  arise when the employer provides the pension. We do  this as an al- 
ternative to analyzing optimal pension policy by a benign State and com- 
paring it with features of what currently exists. It should be possible to 
identify ways of  regulating or supplementing private pensions that are 
likely to  increase welfare. 
The first task is to capture the important features of company pensions 
in a model that is easy to  think about. To identify some of these features, 
we begin by asking why pensions exist, which is to say, why some part of 
what might have been paid as an immediate wage may be converted into 
future pension rights. (This should throw some light on the reasons the 
employer does it for the worker, rather than leaving it to  the worker’s in- 
dependent arrangements.) Then we ask what might be expected to limit 
the extent of deferred payments. We are led to formulate a simple three- 
period model, which is used in sections 11.2-1 1.4 to see how the limita- 
tions referred to affect pensions in the model. In section 11.5 we ask how 
well private pensions in the model would provide for early retirement. The 
remaining sections discuss informally some issues the simple model does 
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not illuminate: the consequences of inflation, the form of pension plans, 
and the effects of  repeated wage and pension negotiations. 
Why, then, might some part of the wage be deferred? In the first place, 
it might be done to provide saving. In the past there have often been tax 
advantages to saving channeled through an employer’s pension plan. In 
any case, a higher return on capital might be available to the larger invest- 
ments handled by the employer, particularly since marketing costs are low 
in this context. A further possibility is that deductions from the wage pro- 
vide a particularly effective commitment to save that could be attractive to 
workers and their representatives who are apprehensive of future weak- 
ness of will. We do not propose to model any of these considerations here, 
since their bearing on pensions is easy to understand and their existence is 
unlikely to affect the desirable form of  a pension plan, given that some 
plan is desirable. 
There is a second class of reasons for deferring part of the wage, namely, 
to provide various kinds of insurance. We  assume workers to be rational, 
an assumption we shall make throughout the paper; thus they would like 
to have insurance against many work-related contingencies. The first and 
most obvious is disability. More generally, there is substantial uncertainty 
for any worker about his future productivity. We want to distinguish be- 
tween uncertainty about his productivity generally and uncertainty about 
his productivity in the current employment relative to his productivity 
elsewhere in the economy. This distinction will later turn out to be quite 
significant. These uncertainties relate to what might be directly observed 
in due course, wages to be earned in the future. There are also important 
uncertainties about the desirability of changing employment for reasons 
other than wage differences, because of, say, changing relationships within 
the firm, with people elsewhere. Indeed there is always uncertainty about 
the relative intertemporal value of consumption, quite apart from desires 
to change employment. Being related, often, to events that are hard to 
verify, these uncertainties cannot be directly the object of insurance. 
A worker would therefore like to put some part of his current full wage 
into providing income in contingencies when it will be more important to 
have. Provision of a pension on final retirement may be a convenient way 
of getting his insurance, if  he can expect to make a small contribution to 
the retirement and disability pensions when he has a lower full wage. It is 
not impossible that, at some stage in his working life, he would want to re- 
duce his guaranteed retirement pension and consume more than his full 
wage currently: depending on the wage history, he might want a negative 
pension or to borrow against pension rights. 
This last consideration suggests that the level of pension contributions 
should vary,  perhaps  greatly, with  the worker’s individual experience. 
Why then should we observe that workers in employment generally have 
their pension plan arranged by the employer rather than by an indepen- 319  Insurance Aspects of Pensions 
dent insurance company? The obvious answer, and probably the right 
one, is that it pays insurance companies to arrange insurance with groups 
of workers rather  than with  individual workers,  both because it saves 
marketing costs (which are remarkably high for individual insurance) and 
because it limits the impact of adverse selection. It is hard to see how these 
advantages can be obtained other than by pension plans universal within a 
company, an occupation, or large categories within a nation. 
Since the providers of pension plans have done so much to eliminate the 
adverse selection problem, we shall take advantage of that to  confine our 
attention (other than some remarks in section 11.5) to the two other issues 
that reduce the extent of insurance: unobservability of events that ideal in- 
surance contracts would relate to, and the inability of workers to commit 
themselves to future payments. The reason that leads a worker to  resign or 
retire may be unobservable: ideal insurance would pay more to a worker 
who becomes unable to work  than to a worker  who could  work  but 
chooses not  to, and it  would  similarly avoid the problem  of  inducing 
workers to leave for pleasanter jobs elsewhere by making pensions condi- 
tional on the reasons for mobility. It turns out that the problem of obser- 
vability interacts with the problem of commitment. The issue of commit- 
ment arises with all future contracts and is controlled  by  law  and by 
reputation. Even when the law allows enforcement of promises to pay, it 
may be costly to ensure compliance: the cost in reputation of  breaking a 
promise is therefore always important. There are also other observable 
costs, such as social disapproval-more  important within some groups 
and classes of commitments than in others-which  we shall ignore. 
Considerations of  reputation suggest that believable and effective com- 
mitments are easier for firms to make than for workers. We discuss this is- 
sue further in section 11.8 at the end of the paper. It might be possible for 
the State to provide cheaply an effective mechanism to ensure compliance 
with commitments made by individual workers, for example by introduc- 
ing voluntary commitments to taxes or social insurance contributions. 
But, on the whole, the appropriate assumption for a realistic model is that 
workers are unable to  commit themselves to make future payments to  em- 
ployers, whereas employers are able to commit themselves to make future 
payments to  workers. We shall assume, for example, that a worker cannot 
enter into arrangements that ensure he does not benefit from accepting a 
higher wage offer from a competing employer, although he might have 
preferred to use the proceeds from such an agreeable contingency in less 
satisfactory states of nature. 
These considerations  suggest that we  model the labor market as fol- 
lows. There are three periods for the worker. In the first period, a wage 
contract is agreed between the worker and the firm employing him. That 
contract specifies the payment to be made in the first period and payments 
to be made by that firm in subsequent periods, contingent on various pos- 320  Peter A. Diamond/James A. Mirrlees 
sibilities, such as whether the worker remains with the initial employer 
and whether he works in the second period. The payments specified refer 
to both of the remaining periods. In the third period, the worker is retired. 
Our economy is competitive: workers and firms compete for one another. 
But workers may have different productivities in different firms-this  is 
an issue in the second period. In the first period, we shall suppose, neither 
worker  nor  firm knows what  the worker’s  productivity  or alternative 
wage opportunities will be in the second period. For the second period, we 
shall consider explicitly a number of the possible patterns of knowledge 
and observation: the worker may or may not know his marginal produc- 
tivity to the firm he was with in the first period, and the firm may or may 
not be able to rely on observation of the wages available to the worker in 
alternative employments. An interesting hybrid case is where the wage in 
alternative employment is observable for determining the level of a trans- 
ferable pension but not for determining the wage should the worker re- 
main with his first-period employer. 
Whatever our assumption about observability, we find it helpful to dis- 
tinguish three  mobility  possibilities. The first is  that, in equilibrium, 
workers never in fact change employment because their productivity is the 
same whichever firm they work for, although they might have moved, and 
equilibriuim contracts take account of that possibility. This situation has 
been studied by Harris and Holmstrom (1982) in a model with many time 
periods: we call it the case of mobility threats. Their model is the starting 
place of  our analysis. The second case is  that of  exogenous mobility, 
where, for reasons not subject to  objective verification, workers may wish 
to move to other employments (or to none). In this case, employment con- 
tracts are drawn up with full awareness that insurance for such an eventu- 
ality might encourage mobility also when the unobservable reasons do not 
apply. The remaining case is called endogenous mobility, where workers 
may find that better wages are available from other firms and the first em- 
ployer may, because they have greater productivity elsewhere, be willing 
to allow them to move. In this case, it may or may not be possible for the 
first employer to observe the alternative wage offers. If it is not possible, 
there is still this distinction between endogenous and exogenous mobility, 
that a rational worker wants to insure against the latter happening and 
against the former not happening. Necessary early retirement because of 
disability is the extreme case of exogenous mobility. 
11.2  Mobility Threats 
We  first set up the model and show it working in the case of mobility 
threats. It is our policy to simplify wherever possible in order to make re- 
sults more vivid. This leads us to specify the same utility of consumption 
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or of disability being subtracted from the utility of consumption as appro- 
priate. We assume that u is increasing, concave, and differentiable with u’ 
tending to + to and zero as consumption goes to zero and + m. We also 
assume a zero real interest rate. In a world ideally well informed, con- 
sumption would then be the same in all periods and all states of nature. 
We focus on deviations from this ideal constancy. 
The marginal productivity of labor with the first employer is denoted by 
ml and mz  in the two periods when there is work. When we come to con- 
sider alternative employers, we shall denote marginal productivity there 
by mi.  Wages actually paid are wl, wz,  and wi,  respectively. Workers have 
no access to a capital market (an extreme assumption made because we are 
emphasizing insurance aspects, and the presence of savings complicates 
matters in some ways, without significantly changing anything that mat- 
ters.’) Firms can freely borrow and lend at a zero real interest rate (an ob- 
vious simplification so long as we are not going to look at the effect of in- 
terest rate changes). Since no problems of  observability or commitment 
attach to the distribution of payments to workers between the second and 
third periods, with workers all receiving payments in the third period, and 
all known to be retired in that period, we may as well aggregate the total 
payment received in these two periods. Whatever it is, it will in fact be di- 
vided equally between the two periods.2 We therefore write 6, b‘ for the 
contribution to pension arising from first-period employment, indicating 
that it may be different if the worker moves to a new occupation in the sec- 
ond period. Total worker income, from wage and pension, in the second 
and third periods is wz  + b or wi + b’ ,  depending on whether he remains 
with his first employer or not. We  write W = wz  + b,  W’ = wi + b’, 
U(w)  = 2U(W/2). 
Firms are taken to be risk neutral. Then in equilibrium, expected pay- 
ments to a worker, including deferred payments, equal his expected mar- 
ginal product. In competing for workers, firms must devise contracts that 
maximize the expected utility of workers, always having regard to mobil- 
ity possibilities. 
In the case of mobility threats, m2  = mi.  If a worker moved in the sec- 
ond period, he could obtain from his new employer income equal to mi. If 
his initial labor contract made that worthwhile, it must pay the first em- 
ployer to change the contract without disadvantage to the worker. Thus 
the equilibrium contract is given by 
max  u(wl)  + EU[  W(m~)l 
(1)  WI, w.1 
subject to  wI  -  ml + E[W(mz)  -  mz].  = 0 
W(mz)  1  m2 
Notice that m2  is a random variable, to which the expectation operator ap- 
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If m2  is such that W(m2)  > m2,  the second constraint does not apply and 
marginal utilities are equated:  W = 2wl. Otherwise the constraint deter- 
mines the wage. Therefore the solution is 
with the first constraint in (1) determining the level of  wl. This is just the 
Harris-Holmstrom result, modified by the presence of a retirement period. 
The Harris-Holmstrom result was that wages do not fall but may rise if 
marginal product increases enough. If we  had a two-period model, with 
V(W)  = u(W),  we  would get the result that the second-period wage is 
higher than the first-period wage if the second-period marginal product is 
higher than the first-period wage. The existence of a retirement period al- 
lows the first employer to pay a pension only if the worker has remained 
with him. Therefore the worker’s current income can remain constant 
with greater probability, increasing for the second and third periods only 
if m2 > 2w1. 
Using nontransferable pension rights becomes less attractive when mo- 
bility may be desirable. 
11.3  Exogenous Mobility 
We introduce exogenous mobility by specifying a positive probability p 
of leaving the first employer by “necessity.” We maintain the assumption 
that a worker who is not under the necessity of moving would have the 
same marginal product in alternative employments as with the first firm. 
It is then a constraint on the contract that such a worker should not be in- 
duced to move. Denoting the marginal product (elsewhere) of a worker 
who has to  move by m ’ ,  we see that the equilibrium contract is defined by 
max  u(wl) + (1 -  p)EU[W(mz)]  + pEU(m’ + b‘) 
(3)  Wl,W(.),b’ 
subject to WI -  ml + (1 -p)E[W(m2) -  m2J + pb‘ = 0 
W(m2 1  m2  + b’,  b‘ 2  0. 
Notice that we  allow for a transferable pension component, b’,  which 
however is independent of m ‘ :  that is, the new wage is supposed to be un- 
observable. The third constraint, that b’ 1  0, expresses the inability of 
workers to commit  themselves to making  future payments.  The main 
questions to be addressed are whether in equilibrium b’ > 0, and if  so, 
how large it is. 
For the same reasons as in the previous section, Wshould be set equal to 
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period wage is just enough to prevent mobility of workers who do not 
need to move. Explicitly, 
(4)  W(m2)  = 2wl,  m2 I  2wl -  b’, 
= m2 + b‘,m2r  2wl -  b’. 
Granted (4), the derivative of expected utility with respect to b‘ is 
(1 -p) r  U’(m  + b’)dF(m)  +pEU‘(m‘  + b’), 
2wl -  b’ 
where Fis  the distribution function for m2.  The derivative of the first con- 
straint in (3) (i.e., minus profit per man) with respect to b’ is 
(1 -  p)[l -  F(2w1 - b’)]  + p  = 1 -  (1 -  p)F(2w1 -  b’). 
Since the value of the constraint is u’(wl)  (by variation of  wI), the first- 
order condition for b’ is that 
(5)  (1 -p) 1  U’(m  + b’)dF(m)  +pEU‘(m‘ + b’) 
2wl -  b’ 
-  [l -  (1 -  p)F(2wi -  b’)]u’(wl) = 0, 
with b’ > 0; or that, alternatively, b’ = 0 and the left-hand side of (5)  is 
nonpositive. When b’ > 0, first-period marginal utility equals second- 
period expected marginal utility. 
Using (4), we also have the zero profit condition: 
2wl- b’ 
(6) 
That is, first-period wages are below the first-period marginal product to 
finance a second-period unconditional transfer of  b’ and an increase in 
the second-period wage when (observed) marginal product is low. When 
can (5)  and (6) be satisfied simultaneously with b’ > O?  One case is where 
the endogenous mobility threat would not be effective with b’ = 0 (m2 c 
2wl for all m2).3 
Proposition I:  Suppose that m2 is known never to take a value greater 
than 
(7) 
WI -  ml  + (1 -p)  (2wl -  b‘ -  m)dF(m)  + b’ = 0. 
0 
M=  ml  + (l-p)E(mz) 
_-  2  3P 
and that 
(8)  U’(M)  c EU’(m‘). 
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Proof: We show that, under the stated assumptions, when b’ is set to 
zero in (6), the left-hand side of (5) is positive. It is therefore impossible 
that b’ = 0, and the desired conclusion follows. With b’ = 0, it is readily 
seen that the solution of (6) is 
WI = M/2, 
for in that case F(2wl) = 1 and the integral is M -  E(m2).  That is, with 
zero transferable pension it is feasible to  equalize pay in both periods. 
Turning to the left-hand side of (5)  with this value of WI,  we see that the 
integral vanishes, and the expression in square brackets becomesp. We get 
pEU‘(m’)  -  pu’(M/2)  = p[EU’(m’)  -  u’(M)], 
which is positive by assumption (8). Q.E.D. 
It will be noticed that, when U’  is convex, a sufficient condition for (8) 
is that M> E(m  ’  ). Granted the first assumption, this is eminently plausi- 
ble, as indeed is (8) for any utility function. The significance of the result 
is that b ’ = 0 only if the distribution of m2  is highly dispersed or departure 
under “necessity” tends to  lower the marginal utility of consumption. The 
upper bound M is quite restrictive: with ml = E(m2)  and p  = 1/2,  M = 
(3/2)E(m2);  but the conditions of the proposition are quite strongly suffi- 
cient. We may safely conclude that often b’ > 0, recognizing that neces- 
sity is likely to  raise the marginal utility of consumption. 
It is not so easy to see just how large 6’ is likely to be. The greater it is, 
the more commonly will second-period wages and the final pension be 
greater than first-period wages. Some insurance for exogenous mobility is 
available, but at the expense of reduced insurance against low second- 
period productivity when mobility is unnecessary. 
The case where m ’ is always zero is that of disability, and in that case b ’ 
is positive whether or not m2  is bounded above by M. We have studied this 
case (with m2  nonrandom) in a previous paper from the point of view of 
the social optimum. We shall return to  the many-period disability case be- 
low in section ll  .5 where we address the commitment issue in more detail. 
11.4  Endogenous Mobility 
We now study a version of the model in which workers may have differ- 
ent values to different employers, the values not being known in the first 
period.  Because workers cannot bind themselves in advance to remain 
with their first employer in the second period, contracts must be nego- 
tiated on the assumption that a worker will move if it pays him to do   SO.^ It 
will pay him to do so if a wage offer from some other employer (net of 
costs of moving) plus any transferable pension rights exceed the wage 
(plus pension) available if he stays with his first employer. To emphasize 
the contrast with the case of exogenous mobility, we suppose that there is 325  Insurance Aspects of Pensions 
no utility or disutility attached to moving, other than what can be allowed 
for in the alternative wage offer; and indeed we assume, in the first in- 
stance, that this net wage offer is observable. This observability assump- 
tion is unduly strong for some cases. We also consider two other alterna- 
tives: that the wage offer is not at all observable and that the wage offer is 
observable for the transferable pension (which is not paid until period 3), 
but not observable at the time of wage offer from the first-period em- 
ployer. As in the implicit contract literature (see Hart [1983] for a survey) 
productivity with the first employer in the second period may not be ob- 
servable.  We  deal  with  that by  considering two cases,  depending  on 
whether m2  is or is not observable. Thus we have six cases to analyze, of 
which we  look at five. We  do not consider more realistic,  less extreme 
cases where outside offers are sometimes observable and marginal prod- 
uct is imperfectly observable. 
Marginal productivities with the original firm and elsewhere (identified 
with the observable wage offer) m2  and mi are jointly distributed without 
atoms, the distribution  being given by a density  function,5 f(m2,  mi). 
Thus, we assume that the distribution of mi is independent of the wage 
contract. With both variables observable, Wand b’ are functions of both 
m2  and mi.  The commitment constraint is that b‘  be nonnegative, and 
movement is determined by which of  Wand mi + b’ is the greater. Equi- 
librium is given by 




11  (  W -  m2vdm2dmi +  w1  -  ml +  1J  b ’  fdmsdmi = 0, 
W>rn;+b’  W<m;+b’ 
b’ r 0. 
As before, the shadow price of the constraint is u’  (wl). For each m2  and 
mi, Wand b’ have to be chosen optimally, that is, so that the function 
(10)  V(Wb’)  = U(W - u’(wl)(W-m2),  Wr  mi + b’,  I  U(mi+b’)  -  u‘(wl)b’,  W<  mi + b‘, 
is maximized subject to b’  L 0. When m2 > mi, the first of these expres- 
sions is larger than the second when we set W = mi + b’.  Therefore we 
maximize the first expression subject to the constraint  W 1  mi (which 
follows from b’ L 0). This is achieved by setting Wequal to the larger of 
2wl and mi.  In that case, b’ can be anything between zero and max (2wl 
-  mi,O),  since it will not be collected. When m2 < mi,  a similar argument 
shows that the worker will be induced to move. Then b’ is set equal to 
max(2wl -  mi,  0), and Wtakes any value less than max(2wl, mi)  since it 
will not be collected. 326  Peter A. Diamond/James A. Mirrlees 
Summarizing, we have 
Proposition 2: With endogenous mobility, observability of wage offers 
and marginal products, and no precommitment by workers, workers go 
where their productivity is greatest in the second period. If productivity is 
greatest with the original employer, income in the second and third peri- 
ods is wI  or mi/2, whichever is the greater. If the best alternative wage of- 
fer is greater than productivity with the original employer, the transfer- 
able pension is just sufficient to increase total income in the second and 
third periods to wl,  if that is greater than mY2,  and the transferable pen- 
sion is zero otherwise. The proposition is illustrated in figure 11.1. 
With m2  not observable by the worker, the firm guarantees minimal lev- 
els of  Wand b’ and preserves the option of raising either variable when m2 
is observed by the firm, if that is in the interest of the firm. We denote the 
guaranteed levels by Wo(mi) and bb(rni).  The worker is assumed to know 
the distribution of payments the firm will actually make. Thus the equilib- 
rium contract remains the solution to (9) with the additional control varia- 
bles Wo,bb  and the additional constraints 
(1 1) 
m2  - IX  Wr  mi + b’, 
WI mi. + b’, 
Kb’ max V*(Kb’)  =  I -b’, 
*  WI 
move 
- 
Fig. 11.1  Propositions 2 and 3. 327  Insurance Aspects of Pensions 
subject to  W(m2,mi) 1  wo(mi) 
b’(m2,mi)  L &(mi). 
The firm can precisely duplicate the optimal contract when m2  is ob- 
servable by setting  WO equal to 2w1  and &(mi)  equal to max[(O,  WO - 
mi)]  and choosing Wand b’ to induce mobility if  and only if mi > m2. 
Since the contract in this case satisfies a maximization problem without 
the additional constraints, the optimum with observability is the optimum 
without observability. Thus we have 
Proposition 3: With outside wage offers observable, the optimal alloca- 
tion is the same whether marginal productivity at the original firm is ob- 
servable or not. 
The  outcome  is  rather  like  the  Harris-Holmstrom  case,  with  the 
“wage,”  or income, remaining constant unless the alternative employ- 
ment opportunity makes an increase in income necessary. It is not the un- 
predictable increase in the worker’s marginal productivity to the economy 
that brings about an (undesirable) increase in his income, but the unpre- 
dictable increase in his marginal productivity to the rest of the economy. 
Thus an economy with fewer but larger firms should have an equilibrium 
closer to the ideal case, since there are fewer possibilities outside the firm, 
implying that the wage then increases in fewer states of nature and a higher 
initial wage results in equilibrium. 
If workers leave one employment in search of a higher income, or have 
incentive to  show a  low  wage  (wl > md2, mi > m2), or are-less 
realistically-unable  to prove that alternative wage offers are genuine,  W 
cannot be made to depend on mi,  although, perhaps with the help of the 
State, b’ might still depend on mi. We examine next the case where 6’ is a 
function of mi  but Wis not. We also make the simplifying assumption (ig- 
noring the search case) that the worker knows mi  when he decides whether 
to move or not, although mi  is not verifiable by the employer. 
If m2  is observable,  W depends only on m2  but b‘  can depend on both 
m2  and mi,  then, considering a particular m2,  U:  and b’ ,  maximize 
(12)  j V(K  b‘Ydmi, 
with Vdefined (as in [lo])  by 
U(W) - u’(w,)(W  -  m2),  W? mi + b’, 
Wemi+  b’.  I  U(mi  + b’) -  u’(wl)b’, 
V(U:b‘)  = 
We  should note straight away that, in this case, Wis never less than 2wI, 
for if it were we could increase V by increasing Wand simultaneously in- 
creasing b’ if necessary to keep the division between the two cases in the 
definition of V unchanged. 
Now consider the choice of b’,  keeping Wfixed for the moment. b’ is 
constrained to be nonnegative. Therefore mi > Wimplies W< mi + b’ , 328  Peter A. Diamond/James A. Mirrlees 
and, bearing in mind that WI  2w1,  b’ should be made as small as possi- 
ble: 
(13)  b’ = 0,mi > W 
Suppose now that mi I  W If m2 I mi,  the worker should be induced to 
stay, for U(W) - u’(w1)W2  U(mi + b‘) -  u’(wl)(mi + b’)when W> 
mi + b‘ . Thus 
(14)  b’< W -  mi,mi 5  m2, W 
If m2 < mi, the worker should be induced to move, with wage plus pen- 
sion as close to Was  possible. This can be done by setting 
(15)  b’=  W-mi+E,mz<miI W, 
where E is a small positive number. E should be “infinitesimally” small. 
With these choices of b‘  ,  we have 
U(W)  - u‘(w~)(W  -  m2), 
U(W) -  u’(wI)(W  -  mi), 
m21mi5  W 
m2  < mi 5 W  V(W b’) = I  U(m  i)  mi> W 
Here, since we have taken account of the mobility decision induced by b’ , 
we can set E  = 0. When m2 I  2wl, Wshould be set equal to 2wl,  since it 
maximizes 
s [WW) -  u’(w1)WIfdmi  + f  [U(mi) -  u’(wdrni1fdmi. 
When m2  > 2w1,  Wshould be less than m2;  for when W>  m2,  the integral 
of Vis 
s [U(W) -  u’(w~)(W  -  mi)] fdmi + 1  U’(miydmi 
W 
0  W 
W 
0  W 
m2 
+ ~’(wI)  1  (m2 -  miydmi, 
0 
which is increased by reducing W > 2wl.  Therefore in fact Wmaximizes 
[[U(W) -  u’(w~)(W  -  mz)]fdmi + f  u(mi)fdmi. 
0  W 
The first-order condition is 
(16)  [U’(W)  -  ~’(wI)] fdmi  = u’(w~)(W  - m~Y(m2,W) 
W 
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We have proved 
Proposition 4: With endogenous  mobility, observability of  marginal 
products with the original firm, but observability of wage offers only for 
the determination of  transferable pensions, a worker whose second-period 
productivity  in all firms is  less than twice his first-period wage has the 
same income in all periods of life, and works where his productivity  is 
greatest; while one whose second-period productivity is greater than that 
in some employment has no transferable pension if  he moves, and if he 
does not move has a wage plus pension less than his productivity, given by 
(16). 
This situation is illustrated in the figure 11.2. 
Equation (16) does not tell us much about W without further assump- 
tions.  When  m2  and  mi are independently  distributed, f(mz,  mi) = 
g(m2)g’(mi),  and we have 
g‘dmi 
(17) 
If, as is reasonable, rg’dmi/g’(W)  is an increasing function of Wfor W 
0 
stay 
Fig. 11.2  Proposition 4. 
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I  2wl,  the right-hand side is an  increasing function, with gradient greater 
than one. It follows that W is an increasing function of m with gradient 
less than one. 
If employment contracts do  not condition b’ on  m2,  but do  condition it 
on mi,  the results are a little less neat, and we do  not explore them here. 
With m2 observable,  equilibrium is given by the same maximization, 
(9), except that Wand b’  are now constrained to be independent of  mi. 
Before turning to the first-order conditions, let us note that Wand b’ are 
set to induce some mobility provided there is a positive probability that mi 
exceeds m2.  There is no mobility if  W - 6’ exceeds the maximal possible 
mi. In this case, consider raising b’ to any level not exceeding  W - mi. 
Doing this makes those who move better off  and saves revenue for the 
firm, since each mover represents a loss in productivity that is no greater 
than the savings in compensation from mobility. Of course, this argument 
does not imply that the optimal b’ equals W -  m2.  Thus we have W -  b’ 
I max mi. The usual envelope argument implies that this inequality is 
strict for the optimal b’ .  This being so, the first-order conditions are 
(1 8) 
W-b’ 
[U’(W  -  u’(wl)l  fdmi 
0 
-  u’(wl)(W - b’ -  m2v(m2,  W - 6’) = 0 
(19)  [  [U’(mi  + b’) -  u’(wl)lfdmi 
+ u’(wl)(W-  b’ -  m2)f(m2,  W -  b‘) = 0 
W-b‘ 
or (19) is nonpositive with b’ = 0. 
The integral in (19) is taken over the range mi > W -  b’ .  Thus we have 
U‘(rni + b’)  < U’(W). 
We analyze the two cases separately. Assume b’  > 0 for the moment. 
Using this in (19), we find that 
[U’(W)  -  ~‘(wI)]  1 fdmi + u’(wl)(W-  b’ -  m2v(m2,  W- b’)  > 0. 
Comparing this with (18),  it is found that 
(20) 
W-  b’ 
U‘(W)  -  u’(w1) > 0 
W-  b’ -  m2 > 0. 
From (20) we have 
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Thus b’ is necessarily zero for m2 2  2wl. The latter condition in (20) rep- 
resents an implicit tax on moving (workers who stay have net compensa- 
tion more than their marginal products). 
Now assume b’ = 0. Then, (18) becomes 
W 
[U’(W)  -  u’(wd1 1  fdmi = u‘(wd(W -  m2Mm2, w). 
0 
Thus we have 
sign (W -  2w,) = sign (m2  - W). 
Thus Wlies between 2wl and m2  for values of m2  for which 6‘ is set equal 
to zero. We can conclude that workers with high marginal products are 
paid less than their marginal products. 
Summarizing these results, we have 
Proposition 5: With endogenous mobility, observability of  marginal 
products with the original firm but no observability of wage offers, and 
no precommitment by workers, income is lower in the second and third 
periods than in the first for any worker who remains with the original em- 
ployer and has marginal product below the first-period wage. For workers 
with positive transferable pensions, the pension is les than W -  1712.  For 
any worker who remains with the original employer  and has marginal 
product above the first-period wage, there is no transferable pension, and 
income is higher in the later period than in the first period but less than the 
marginal product. The question of which values of m2  have b’ positive ap- 
pears to be difficult in general, depending on the properties off.  The 
proposition is illustrated in figure 1 1.3. 
One case remains to be analyzed, that where neither m2  nor mi is ob- 
servable. In this case, the firm chooses wI,  Wo, bb, W(m& and b’(m2)  to 
maximize (9) subject to the constraints of self-interest in the second peri- 
od: 
(22)  wb’  max Tb’(mz-  wdmi  +  1 -b’fdmi 
0  W-b’ 
subject to  W 2 WO 
b’ L b6 
Thus we have the first-order conditions 
W- b‘ 
(m2 - W + b’)f(m2,  W - b’) - 1 fdmi I  0 
0 
-(m2 - W + b’)f(mz,  W - 6’)  -  5  fdmi 5  0 
(23) 
W:  b’ 
with equality if W > Wo and b ’ > 61, respectively. From the signs of the 
different terms, we have either  W =  Wo  or b’  = bb, or possibly both. 332  Peter A. Diqmond/James A. Mirrlees 
stay  - 
income = W(m) 
Fig. 11.3  Proposition 5. 
Moreover, b’  = bb for m2  > WO -  66  and W = WO  for mz  < WO -  bb. In 
addition, where W > WO, W < mz  + b6. Where b’ > bb, b’ < WO -  m2. 
To analyze  Wo and bb we would need to consider the first-order condi- 
tions from (9). This is a messy calculation since Wdepends on bb when W 
> Wo and b’ depends on Wo when b’  > b6, and we leave analysis of this 
problem for the future. 
11.5  Early Retirement 
In the models analyzed above, everyone worked in the first two periods 
and no one worked in the third. This approach ignores the wide spread in 
the distribution  of  retirement  ages that is currently  observed.  Indeed, 
many pension plans allow a choice of retirement age and relate the size of 
pension to the age at which it is first claimed as well as wage history and 
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Our earlier analyses of public retirement systems concentrated on the 
relationship between optimal benefit size and age at retirement. In that 
work, there is naturally no constraint corresponding to the nonnegativity 
of transferable pension rights. We recall the ideas of that analysis briefly 
and relate it to the issues in the current paper by checking when the non- 
negatively constraint on worker debt to the firm needed for private pen- 
sions is binding. 
Assume that both the productivity of workers and the fact of working 
are observable but the ability to work (taken to be a zero-one variable) is 
not. Then, ignoring those unable to work their entire lives, one can imple- 
ment a system of  lump sum redistributions based on productivity  and 
have actuarially fair pensions. Actuarially fair pensions imply that the ex 
post lifetime budget constraint varies with the length of working career in 
the same way as output produced. Length of  working career depends on 
both choice and random factors affecting productivity. (This is a short- 
hand for factors that affect the disutility of work and the availability of 
jobs as well as productivity.) There are two reasons for believing that one 
may be able to improve on the choice of actuarially fair pensions for a 
public redistribution and retirement system-income  redistribution and 
insurance provision. 
To isolate the income redistribution motive, let us temporarily ignore 
the uncertainty about work ability. If individuals differ in (unobservable) 
labor disutility as well as productivity, then lump sum redistribution based 
solely on productivity still leaves room for further redistribution based on 
disutility of labor. Normally, those retiring earlier will have a higher social 
marginal utility of consumption. It is therefore worthwhile to distort the 
retirement decision to redistribute further toward early retirees, who have 
lower ex post budget constraints. (Essentially the same argument holds 
when  we  consider  the  insurance  argument  below.)  This  argument  is 
strengthened once we  recognize that redistribution for productivity dif- 
ferences is done by a distorting annual income tax rather than a lump sum 
tax. Income redistribution is then limited by work incentive problems on 
hours worked. Rather than an actuarially fair pension system (with fair- 
ness defined in terms of the government’s total budget), it is likely to be 
appropriate also to redistribute in a way that discourages longer working 
lives, once we recognize the positive correlation between productivity and 
length of working life (which reflects a negative correlation between pro- 
ductivity and disutility of labor as well as higher compensation). 
Under conventional economic assumptions redistribution plays no role 
in private pension design (although unions may be concerned). Indeed, 
adverse selection problems imply that the attempt to provide insurance 
against early loss of earnings ability will have a cost. We ignore both redis- 
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With all individuals ex ante identical in productivity, preferences, and 
disability risk, actuarially favorable early retirement provisions provide 
insurance against an early loss of earnings ability and are a natural part of 
the optimal labor contract. In our earlier papers, we derived equations for 
the optimal wage and retirement benefit plans under the alternative as- 
sumptions that workers do, or do not, save on their own. If we now make 
the same commitment assumptions as in the first part of the present paper 
and assume identical opportunities elsewhere, the socially optimal con- 
tracts remain privately feasible as long as expected future compensation is 
not less than expected future productivity. We  now examine when this 
condition is satisfied. 
In both of our earlier papers we related lifetime consumption under the 
optimal plan to length of working life for the case of  constant marginal 
product.  Lifetime consumption was an increasing function of working 
life,  but  increasing  more  slowly  than  lifetime  production  (until  the 
planned retirement date, when the rates of increase are equal). Put differ- 
ently, the optimal plan has an implicit tax on work throughout the work- 
ing life up to the planned retirement age, when the tax is zero. This is the 
natural way to provide insurance against the adverse event of early retire- 
ment. Under the simple institution of a wage paid that is either consumed 
or saved, the optimal plan is thus not sustainable under mobility since the 
taxes on work are used to finance a lump sum transfer at the start of work- 
ing life. 
Pensions, however, represent a different institutional setting from sim- 
ple annual wage payments, with pension benefits at a future date depend- 
ing on the date of retirement. In actual pensions, benefits are paid condi- 
tional  on stopping  work  at  one’s  own  firm.  In a  world  of  uniform 
marginal products and costless mobility this condition has no bite, and 
pensions  do not  offer  any greater  insurance possibilities than simple 
wages. If pensions are conditional on full retirement, then there is the pos- 
sibility of insurance. The private equilibrium can support the social opti- 
mum if  there is implicit taxation of early work, but not if there is implicit 
subsidization of early work. To examine the feasibility of privately imitat- 
ing the social optimum we consider the following institution. Work at age 
t results in a wage of  c(t)  which is fully consumed. Retirement at age t re- 
sults in a benefit b(t)  for all later periods of life. Mobility at age t results in 
a lump sum transfer of resources R(t)  which is taken to an alternative firm 
to help finance retirement.  The socially optimal system is privately sup- 
portable if the optimal b(t)  and c(t)  imply a net surplus of output over ex- 
pected payments, which is nonnegative. 
A worker who moves at age t must bring to his new employer an amount 
sufficient to cover the expected value of future payments to him, net of his 
product in the firm, in case he stays with a new employer until retirement. 
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vided that the new transfer sum is similarly just sufficient to cover the ex- 
pected net loss from employing him. We express this formally, using the 
notation of our previous papers, whereF(t) is the probability that a worker is 
still able to work at age t;  ris the age at which a healthy person retires; Tis 
the length of life; and m is the constant marginal product. It is convenient 
to write the equation in terms of the expected values of transfer, and of 
payments subsequent to t,  with the expectation taken as of time 0. The 
same result of course follows if  we use conditional probabilities. The re- 
quired level of R(t) satisfies 
r 
(24)  R(t)[l -  F(t)l =  [c(s)  -  m][l -  F(s)lds 
1 
+  b(s)(T -  s)f(s)ds  + b(r)(T -  r)[l -  F(r)]. 
f 
R would be zero at t = 0 by the budget balance constraint for the social 
optimum. R is evidently positive at t = r. If the right-hand side should be 
first a nondecreasing function of  t, then nonincreasing, it would follow 
that R I  0 for all t. Differentiating, we see that this is true when there ex- 
ists s I  r such that 
(25)  5  mfort 5  s 
c(t) + b(t)(T -  t)  f(t) 
1 -  F(t) 
I  mfors I  t I  r. 
Since, as we showed in the papers referred to, b and c are increasing func- 
tions of t, a sufficient condition for R I  0 is that 
is a nondecreasing function oft. 
This holds in particular for the uniform distribution, and more generally 
when 
Since (26) is very strongly sufficient for (25), we conclude that it is none 
too easy to find simple cases where the social optimum should not, in the- 
ory, be privately implementable. Yet again, we find that a system of trans- 
ferable pension rights is, besides being evidently desirable, consistent with 
private rationality. Even if  the socially optimal R were sometimes nega- 
tive, it would still be true that a constrained optimum would have R posi- 
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11.6  Inflation 
The analysis above made no mention of inflation. If inflation were fully 
neutral, the analysis above would stand and imply labor contracts in real 
terms.  However,  inflation often occurs at times when other factors are 
changing too. To analyze inflation in the setting used above, one would 
want to know how the joint distribution of marginal products with and 
without mobility tends to change as inflation rises. Also one would want 
to incorporate changes in real interest rates. We have not pursued such an 
analysis. 
It is natural, also, to ask how existing pension structures are affected by 
inflation. This requires consideration of the full labor contract. With a de- 
fined contribution pension plan, workers bear the real interest rate risk as- 
sociated with inflation assuming that the response of wages to inflation is 
independent of the size of  existing pension fund. While this is a plausible 
assumption, there is nothing to prevent actual or implicit contracts from 
relating current wages to pension fund performance. Analysis of optimal 
sharing of real interest risk would require a description of  the full portfo- 
lio positions of workers and shareholders. Under a defined contribution 
plan, workers who have left a firm bear the full risk. 
With  defined  benefit  plans,  we  should again distinguish  between  de- 
parted  and present  workers.  For  departed workers,  the presence  of  a 
promise to pay future sums stated in nominal terms is a plan to make 
workers worse off, and firms better off, the greater the inflation rate. De- 
creases in the real rate of return would lessen the advantage accruing to 
firms. Only when a rise in inflation decreases the nominal rate of return 
does it move the utility of firms and workers in the same direction. Thus 
defined benefit plans appear, at first examination, not to  be part of an op- 
timal contract. 
For workers staying with a firm, the sharing of inflation risk depends 
on the relationship of final wages to inflation. In some cases it is clear that 
workers are protected as part of the long-term contract (in contrast to the 
lack of protection under spot contracts, as analyzed by Bulow [1982]). For 
example, if wages depend on job done and on age, and the allocation of 
workers to  jobs depends on ability, and perhaps seniority (with the usual 
effect of seniority), pension obligations are in real terms to the extent that 
labor contracts will be independent of past pension obligations. This inde- 
pendence will generally depend on the proportions of workers of different 
ages and is very likely to be true where near retirees are a small fraction of 
the labor force. 
11.7  Pension Plans 
The analysis so far has considered a single worker. In effect, it applies to 
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Even if workers differ in some dimension but behave identically in supply- 
ing labor to the firm, the analysis applies. We can consider the discovery 
by workers of their true productivity distributions as one of the risks being 
insured by the labor contract. The only problem for the firm is having the 
correct productivity distribution for doing the expected present discounted 
value calculation. 
If workers are aware of their differences (or merely have labor supply 
responses to contractual terms that are correlated  with productivities), 
then there is an adverse selection problem along with the moral hazard 
problem of mobility. (We continue to ignore other moral hazard problems 
associated with effort.)  We  do not model this formally, but simply ask 
what kind of worker is particularly attracted to the equilibrium contract 
for a given level of expected productivity. We suppose  that alternative em- 
ployments offer wages equal to  marginal products each period. 
When there is no equilibrium mobility, and wages are downwardly rigid, 
the convexity of the second-period wage schedule in terms of productivity 
(eq. [2]) makes the contract particularly attractive  to high-risk workers, as 
well as to risk-averse workers. In the case of endogenous mobility, work- 
ers with lower anticipated outside offers are particularly attracted. These 
workers are most likely to collect  on the insurance premium implicitly 
paid in the first period. In the case of  exogenous mobility, the answer de- 
pends on the division of insurance benefits between  unfortunate moves 
and low productivity in continued employment. In the mixed case, the lat- 
ter seems likely to predominate empirically. 
Once we consider heterogeneity of the labor force, two of our simplify- 
ing assumptions-no  worker savings and risk neutrality of the firm-ap- 
pear much less satisfactory. Without savings by workers, there is consider- 
able symmetry  between  oversaving  and  undersaving  for a  particular 
worker's ex post (and so ex ante) position, as can be seen by considering 
movements along an intertemporal budget line away from the optimal al- 
location. With worker savings we introduce a further moral hazard prob- 
lem (as has been discussed in our earlier papers). In addition, any asym- 
metries in market opportunities for savings and dissavings would imply 
that workers find it easy to save to offset undersaving but hard to borrow 
to offset oversaving. This asymmetry translates into an asymmetry in the 
evaluation of pension plans that oversave for some and undersave for oth- 
ers. Presumably, that is a case for smaller plans than the analysis above 
would suggest, but we have not undertaken formal analysis. 
Risk neutrality of firms was a very handy simplifying assumption. But 
bankruptcy means that firms are not risk neutral either about outcomes or 
about paying promised'benefits in all states of nature. We do not pursue 
this. We have also ignored the complications that come from firm-specific 
risks and decreasing returns, which have been central to much of the im- 
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11.8  Repeated Negotiations 
The models analyzed above can be used for normative purposes; for ex- 
ample, one can evaluate the degree of success of existing arrangements in 
achieving a constrained optimal allocation for the models. With the addi- 
tional assumption of optimal contracting, the model becomes a positive 
model of equilibrium. As a positive model, some of  its assumptions may 
be too inaccurate empirically to serve as an adequate model. One such as- 
sumption is that of objective probabilities. There is little reason to  believe 
that subjective probabilities about events affecting the value of the life- 
time labor contract are either similar between worker and firm or correct 
for workers. Firms have a direct financial experience to draw on in revis- 
ing beliefs. Workers experience retirement a small number of times. Inso- 
far as subjective beliefs of workers and firms are different, labor contracts 
will, in part, be bets on the events for which the parties have different be- 
liefs. Thus, inaccuracy of the assumption of identical beliefs is likely to 
have sizable implications for the equilibrium allocation of  resources. 
A second source of potential shortcoming is the assumption of  a life- 
time contract that is binding on the firm. Mostly, we see labor contracts 
that are at-will contracts (no set termination, with freedom to  terminate at 
any time or after notice which is short relative to a working lifetime) or 
contracts for a relatively short time, one to three years.  The short con- 
tracts, however, are associated with considerably longer relationships, on 
average.6 Since circumstances  generally change over time, there is little 
reason to think that a series of equilibrium short-term contracts (under 
some bargaining  theory) would produce the same allocation as a single 
long-term contract (under the same bargaining  theory).  However,  this 
may not be the right comparison if a model of short contract equilibrium 
is not an accurate picture of the economic environment. We mention three 
reasons for doubting that account. First, some agents behave as if  they 
were legally bound even when they are not. Second, firm reputation may 
affect both current worker efficiency and the ability to attract additional 
workers, making it optimal for a firm to carry out implicit contracts. We 
return to a reputation model below. Third, government rules affecting the 
labor market (both legislated and common law) affect the validity of the 
assumptions of the classical short-term contract equilibrium model (i.e., 
imply some ability to commit beyond the length of contract). We will dis- 
cuss these mechanisms in the process of discussing the short-term model 
introduced  by  Bulow and coauthors (Bulow  1982; Bulow  and Scholes 
1984; Bulow et al. 1984). 
In the classical competitive model the wage equals the marginal product 
of labor. If part of the wage is paid currently and part in deferred compen- 
sation, total compensation in equilibrium equals the marginal product. 
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between total compensation and marginal product would generalize to a 
matching model where the next best alternatives for both firm and worker 
were strictly inferior to their current match.  Then total compensation 
would continue to be determined independently of the pension structure. 
Under this interpretation (and a finite horizon), one cannot have a perfect 
equilibrium where firms carry out implicit contracts that imply total com- 
pensation in excess of marginal product late in life. Presumably, in reach- 
ing the short-term contract equilibrium, some further mechanism (such as 
transaction costs) is involved to rule out explicit longer-term contracts 
that provide insurance. 
For both of these models (classical and matching), we can examine the 
robustness with respect to legal and institutional considerations of the re- 
sult that the absence of explicit long-term contracts implies a short-term 
contract equilibrium in terms of total compensation. The Age Discrimina- 
tion Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age. Generally, nondis- 
crimination legislation has been interpreted in terms of wages, not total 
compensation, making it illegal to pay lower wages to an otherwise identi- 
cal worker for whom fringe benefits are more expensive. Presumably this 
would hold for defined benefit pensions, where the cost of the pension 
varies with both age and seniority. Thus in the presence of this act, we can- 
not have an equilibrium with both defined benefit plans and age uniform 
total compensation. 
Even without the Age Discrimination Act, common law requires good 
faith exercise of discretion in completion of a contract (see Burton 1980). 
Good faith can be seen as a preservation of  expectations. Thus, if every- 
one understands that equilibrium is in terms of total compensation, it is 
not bad faith to carry it out. If workers believe that wages are independent 
of pension promises in “normal” times and pension plans will not be ter- 
minated in “normal” times, then firing of  workers, plan terminations, 
and low wage offers solely to preserve a relation between total compensa- 
tion and marginal product would probably be held to be bad faith actions 
and result in liability for compensatory damages.s Thus, legal restrictions 
can enforce and make credible some implicit contracts much as they do 
explicit contracts. 
Thus, it appears that legal interpretations of employment relations and 
pension provisions would sustain an equilibrium with some degree of in- 
surance for workers even in an economy where explicit intertemporal la- 
bor contracts did not exist. In addition to this mechanism, it may be possi- 
ble to construct a perfect equilibrium with implicit contracts once one 
recognizes that firms have (potentially) infinite horizons. 
Although it seems to be a promising line of inquiry, we have not devel- 
oped a formal model of equilibrium (perfect or otherwise) with reputation 
effects. Nevertheless, we shall sketch briefly how such a model might look 
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To start, assume no uncertainty for a firm but uncertainty for individ- 
uals plus a desire to save by way of pensions. Assume that the supply of 
new workers depends on current treatment of older workers as a basis for 
forecasting how new workers will be treated in the future. (This overlap- 
ping generations model seems simpler than the probably more important 
effect of reputation on efficiency of existing workers.) In some circum- 
stances, it becomes worthwhile for firms to overpay (at least some) cur- 
rent older workers relative to their marginal products and alternative jobs. 
In a steady state, with naive expectations and an interest rate equal to the 
growth rate, the equilibrium contract will probably be similar to the ones 
analyzed in sections 11.2-11.4  above. The critical condition is that the 
profitability of continuing to fulfill these contracts exceeds that from ex- 
ploitation of  current older workers and an end to implicit ~ontracting.~ 
Critical to this possibility is the assumption of noninsurable, nondiversi- 
fiable risk, which makes a risk-averse worker value the asset of  future 
benefits more highly than the firm values the liability of providing those 
benefits. In this equilibrium, one will have inflation protection for work- 
ers who have pension benefits keyed  to final wages or pension benefits 
regularly adjusted in step with general wages. One may also have an effect 
on capital accumulation similar to that of unfunded social insurance. 
The use of reputation rather than contracts for this mechanism affects 
the outcomes in a major way once one recognizes the importance of un- 
certainty  for firms. First, events may occur that decrease the value of 
maintaining reputation, for example, bankruptcy or a corporate takeover 
permitting a repudiation of the previous management's implicit contracts. 
Then, the optimal contract must consider not only the problem of worker 
mobility but also the need to maintain the value of preserving reputation. 
This fact probably limits the extent to which insurance can be offered to 
workers and brings in a major role for funding rules in determining sus- 
tainable benefit packages. Second, a model with firm risk probably im- 
plies the sharing of  profitability risk by workers, a phenomenon that ap- 
pears to be present in the United States.'O Pension rules then affect the 
distribution of wage risks among workers of  different ages. There is an a 
priori suspicion that final wage defined benefit plans put too much risk on 
near retirees because of the leverage of wage changes on future pension 
benefits. The same conclusion would hold for a flat or service-related plan 
that sustained a constant ratio of pension benefit parameter to wages. 
Third, the implicit contract sustained by reputation effects is likely to  be a 
very complicated contract, suggesting all the concerns normally associat- 
ed with consumer protection in the presence of complicated contracts. " 
11.9  Summary 
Using a variety of competitive three-period models, this paper analyzes 
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workers and try to provide insurance against poor levels of second-period 
productivity. The first period has known productivity, while the third has 
retirement.  With no restrictions  on observability or commitment  (and 
zero interest, for convenience), the optimal contract would yield constant 
consumption over the three periods, equal to one-third of the expected 
value of the sum of productivities in the two working periods. In the sec- 
ond period, the worker would move to another firm if and only if the of- 
fered wage exceeded his marginal product with his first-period employer. 
The worker would receive a payment from the first-period employer if his 
second-period wage were less than the contracted consumption level over 
his two remaining periods, and the worker would make a payment to his 
first-period employer if  his second-period wage exceeded the contracted 
consumption level over his two remaining periods. The starting place of 
our analysis is that this contract is not attainable. Throughout the paper, 
we assume that the worker cannot commit himself either to staying with 
his first-period employer in the second period or to paying compensation 
to his first-period employer should he leave the firm. We assume that the 
firm can commit itself to a three-period contract, limited only by observa- 
bility restrictions. (We also speculate on how the analysis would change if 
firm reputation replaced commitment.) 
If  it is known that the worker’s productivity with his first-period em- 
ployer is the same as his best alternative wage offer, there is a threat of 
mobility limiting the contract, but no reason for the worker to leave the 
firm that helps the design of  the optimal contract. The optimal contract 
has nondecreasing consumption over time and increasing consumption if 
second-period productivity is large enough. In order to limit the extent to 
which the mobility threat curtails the provision of insurance, the optimal 
contract has no further payment to any worker who leaves his first-period 
employer. When there is no social reason for mobility, it is natural for the 
contract to discourage mobility as much as possible-by  having no trans- 
ferable pension, in this case. 
The central focus of  the paper is  the examination  of  circumstances 
where this conclusion does not hold. That is, we  identify circumstances 
where the optimal contract contains deferred payments to workers who 
switch employers. 
First we note that workers sometimes leave firms for reasons other than 
higher wages elsewhere. These reasons include health and interpersonal 
relations which limit the ability to continue performing the work (or raise 
its disutility) and a variety of reasons for geographic mobility that may 
preclude continued employment in the same job. If  there is sufficiently 
low expected marginal utility of consumption conditional on such a move, 
a positive transferable pension is called for, even though this decreases the 
insurance available against low productivity with the first-period employer. 
Second, we examine the case where individuals only leave an employer 
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ginal productivity with the first-period  employer  at the same time that 
both wage and productivity are low, there is a reason for the optimal con- 
tract to contain a pension payment for a worker who leaves his first-period 
employer. The extent of these payments depends on the observability of 
both productivity with the first-period employer and the wage offer else- 
where. With both of these observable, the optimal contract implies that 
the worker moves if and only if his wage elsewhere exceeds his marginal 
productivity with the original firm. The transferable pension is positive 
when the wage elsewhere is sufficiently low. This same outcome is achiev- 
able with suitable counteroffers by the firm when the wage elsewhere is 
observable but productivity with the first-period employer is not observ- 
able. 
The analysis becomes more complicated when there are limits on the 
observability  of the outside wage offer. For reasons of  tractability,  we 
only consider cases where productivity with the first-period employer is 
observable. Two cases are analyzed-where  the outside offer is never ob- 
servable by the firm and where it  is not observable in time to make a 
counteroffer but becomes observable in time to  condition the transferable 
pension on earnings elsewhere. 
When the transferable pension can depend on earnings elsewhere, low 
earnings and low productivity result in constant consumption over time, a 
positive transferable pension, and mobility if and only if wages elsewhere 
exceed productivity with the first-period employer. With low productivity 
and a high outside offer, there is mobility and no transferable pension. 
With high productivity, there is no transferable pension and a wage offer 
from the first-period employer below productivity.  Mobility depends on 
the comparison  of  wage  offers.  Thus, workers sometimes move  when 
wages elsewhere are below productivity with the first-period firm. 
When the outside offer is totally unobservable, both types of inefficiency 
become possible.  When productivity is high, the worker will sometimes 
move to a wage below  his productivity.  When productivity  is low, the 
worker sometimes will stay with his first-period employer even though the 
wage exceeds productivity.  There will be a positive transferable pension 
for some of his productivities. 
Notes 
1. To see the effects of private savings on optimal social insurance, contrast our paper, 
2. This is not quite right if deferred payments are made only in period 3, but there is no 
3. We are indebted to Robert Merton for pointing out this aspect of this example. 
4. For analyses of  mobility with alternative  contractual assumptions, see Mortenson 
(1978), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Hall and Lazear (1981). Moore (1982), Deere (1983), 
and Spinnewyn (1982). 
(1978)and (1982). 
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5. We also assume thatfhas a sufficiently  large support to allow all the cases we consider 
below. In particular, we assume that mi  might be larger or smaller than m2 for all values of 
m2  and m2 might be larger or smaller than 2wl for the equilibrium value of w1. 
6. Hall (1982) has estimated that approximately half of current jobs will have lasted for at 
least 20 years by their termination. From his numbers, one can also infer the obverse, that 
approximately half of workers will never hold any single job for as long as 20 years. 
7. Bulow and Scholes (1984) consider a model where implicit contracts between firm and 
worker are replaced by implicit contracts among workers. Because of the complications of 
union institutional structure and politics we confine our discussion to nonunion plans. How- 
ever, it is tempting to speculate on the large differences between single-employer and multi- 
employer plans. 
8. Firing a salesman to prevent his collecting commissions on a previously negotiated 
deal did lead to damages in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts 1977, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1851. We are indebted to Melvin Eisen- 
berg for this reference. 
9. For models of reputation  for consumer good quality with a similar character,  see 
Dybvig and Spatt (1980), Klein and Leffler (1981). and Shapiro (1981). 
10. This appearance is clearest in the use of profit sharing for defined contribution plans. 
11. The ERISA rules to limit backloading are an example of such consumer protection. It 
is curious that the rules assume no wage growth. 
CO~l’l’leIlt  Robert C. Merton 
1.  Introduction 
In a world of full information and perfect markets, where all assets (in- 
cluding human capital) are freely tradable, private pensions provide noth- 
ing more than another way for individuals to save.’ With a full comple- 
ment of  risk-sharing securities available, the worker can fully offset or 
modify any particular  form of  payouts prescribed by the pension plan. 
Hence, the type of pension plan offered would be a matter of indifference 
to workers. Like the Modigliani-Miller theorem for corporate liabilities, 
the optimal choice of pension plan would at most be a function of the tax 
laws and perhaps certain kinds of  transactions costs. In such an environ- 
ment and in the absence of explicit contracts to the contrary, the spot- 
market view of total employee compensation would obtain where this pe- 
riod’s wages plus incremental vested retirement benefits are equal to the 
worker’s current marginal product.2 For pension plans to have a greater 
functional significance than that of “just one more security,” there must 
Robert C. Merton is J. C. Penney Professor of Management at the Sloan School of Man- 
agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and research associate, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
1. The saving component is obvious for a defined contribution plan. It also takes place 
for a defined benefit plan whether or not the firm funds the plan with a pension fund since 
the (pension) liability issued to the worker in lieu of other cash compensation provides re- 
sources to the firm for financing investment just like the issuing of any other liability. 
2. This assumes that firms are competitors in the labor market. For a development of the 
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be important market imperfections,  and the most likely place for these 
imperfections to occur is in the labor market.’ 
There are, of course, severe impediments to the trading of  human cap- 
ital. The two most  prominent explanations for this nontradability  are 
(1) the moral hazard or incentive problem that having once sold off  the 
rights to their earnings, workers will no longer have the incentive to  work, 
and (2) the broad  social and legal prohibition  of  (indentured) slavery 
whether voluntary or otherwise. The well-known effects of  this nontrad- 
ability are to “force” workers to save more than they might otherwise 
choose and to cause them to bear much of  the risk (both systematic and 
nonsystematic)4 of their human capital. In addition to distorting the con- 
sumption-saving choice, the nonoptimal risk bearing of the risks of hu- 
man capital may cause inefficient investment of resources in developing 
human capital.’ 
In “Insurance Aspects of Pensions,” Diamond and Mirrlees explore the 
possible role of private pensions in insuring the worker against some of 
the risk associated with his nonmarketable human capital.6  Their analysis 
leans heavily on the Harris and Holmstrom (1982) theory of implicit con- 
tracts in the labor market. By assuming away the incentive problems asso- 
ciated with the effective sale of human capital, Diamond and Mirrlees fo- 
cus on contracts that taken into account the limitations on workers to 
bind themselves now to work in the future for less than they could other- 
wise earn in the absence of such contracts. 
As Diamond and Mirrlees themselves note, their model uses a number 
of assumptions that are wholly unrealistic even by the standards of casual 
empiricism.  Many  of  these  assumptions  are constructive  in that they 
merely simplify the analysis without  severely distorting the validity of 
their central conclusions. Others, however, are crucial in reaching their re- 
sults, and it is on these that I focus this discussion. 
As  will  be  shown,  the  structure  of  the  labor  contracts  derived  by 
Diamond and Mirrlees (and, for that matter, by Harris and Holmstrom) 
are isomorphic to various put and call option contracts. Reformulating 
3. If the state is paternalistic and wants to avoid the free rider problem, it may choose to 
provide tax incentives to induce saving through pensions together with nonassignment of the 
pension and penalties for early withdrawal to enforce the availability of adequate unencum- 
bered assets for the individual to fund his retirement. Even with no  labor market imperfec- 
tions, these distortions could lead to optimal characteristics for pension plans that minimize 
the effects of the distortions. 
4. Nonsystematic risk is risk that can be eliminated through diversification when there 
are available adequate risk-sharing financial instruments. Systematic risk is risk that cannot 
be eliminated by these means and hence is a risk that must be borne by the economy even 
with perfect insurance markets. 
5. Thus, a worker may spend real resources to reduce the risk of his human capital by 
pursuing training that makes him able to undertake a wider variety of jobs. Such diversifica- 
tion of the worker’s human capital would not be an optimal allocation if it simply reduces 
nonsystematic risk. 
6. See Nalebuff and Zeckhauser (1981), especially App. 1, for a similar analysis. 345  Insurance Aspects of Pensions 
their findings in this context will help to shed light on the sensitivity of 
their conclusions to certain of their assumptions. Moreover, the extensive 
literature on the evaluation of options permits the derivation of compara- 
tive statics results that might otherwise not be apparent.’  The options 
analogy is developed first in section 2 within the context of the “mobility- 
threat” model where the equilibrium contract leads to no actual changes 
in employer by the worker. In section 3, the analogy is extended to the 
more complex cases of exogenous and endogenous mobility where work- 
ers will change employers under the appropriate equilibrium conditions. 
Section 4 provides a brief summary and overview of the Diamond-Mirr- 
lees model. 
2.  Optimal Labor Contracts Viewed  as Options: Mobility Threats 
The model presented in section 11.2 of the Diamond-Mirrlees paper as- 
sumes a three-period life for each worker (two work periods and a retire- 
ment period) and that workers are risk averse with an additive separable 
and symmetric utility function for lifetime consumption. It is  assumed 
that firms have full access to a well-functioning capital market and that all 
securities are priced to yield the same expected return. This “common” 
expected return is assumed to be zero in real terms, and all contracts (ex- 
plicit or implicit) are expressed in real terms. In sharp contrast, workers 
are assumed to have no access to the capital market and own no assets other 
than their human capital. Thus, workers cannot borrow, and they can 
only save if the firm (acting as an intermediary) does it for them. In this 
version of the model it is assumed that a worker’s marginal product in pe- 
riod t (t = l,  2) is the same for all firms (i.e., mt = rn3. (This assumption 
is relaxed in later sections.) Firms (other than perhaps the worker’s cur- 
rent employer) are always willing to pay the worker his marginal product 
(to them), mi,  if the employee is willing to move. 
To locate and understand the model, consider first the case where there 
are no restrictions on contracts between the worker and the firm. In this 
case, the only constraint on the contract is that its present value, PY satisfy 
(1)  PV = ml  + E(mz), 
which is the value to the firm at time 1 of receiving the labor of the worker 
throughout his work life. Because there is no risk premium paid for risk 
bearing and workers are risk averse, the optimal (worker utility maximiz- 
ing) contract provides for the worker to bear no risk. By the assumptions 
of symmetric utility and a zero interest rate, the optimal contract would 
pay the worker a first-period wage,  wI  = PV/3; a guaranteed second- 
period wage, wz  = PV/3;  and a pension benefit payment, b = PV/3.  In 
return, the worker would agree to work for his original employer for his 
7. See Smith (1976) and Mason and Merton (1984) for surveys of the option literaturein- 
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entire work life, independently of what his (currently unknown) marginal 
product, m2, turns out to be in period 2. If the worker were permitted to 
enter into such a binding agreement with his employer, then this unre- 
stricted optimal contract is feasible. 
The worker cannot, however, bind himself to work for his current em- 
ployer in the second period. The employer must, therefore, take into ac- 
count that the worker will leave in the event that the total compensation 
offered by  a competing firm in the second period plus any transferable 
component of his pension from his original employer, mi + b‘ ,  exceeds 
the total compensation 2PV/3 provided by the contract with his original 
employer. Thus, unless the probability that mi + b ’ > 2PV/3 is zero, the 
unrestricted optimal contract is  not feasible and the worker must bear 
some risk. 
Given this constraint and the condition that b’  2 0, Diamond and 
Mirrlees (eq. [2]) show that the optimal contract calls for a (combined re- 
tirement and) second-period compensation given by 
(2)  W(m2)  = max (2~1,  m~) 
and a transferable pension b ’ = 0. 
A call option on a security (or payment) gives its owner the right to  buy 
the security at a specified price I (the “exercise price”) as of a given date. 
The right to buy also implies the right not to buy. If the owner chooses not 
to buy, the call option expires, worthless. Thus, the payoff to a call option 
on its expiration date is given by max (0, X -  I), where Xis  the price of 
the security on that date. Rewriting (4) as 
(2’)  W(m2)  = 2wl + max(0, mz  -  2wl), 
we have that the optimal contract provides for a guaranteed payment of 
2w1 plus a call option on the worker’s second-period marginal product 
with an exercise price of 2w1. If C(X,  I) denotes the market value of a call 
option on a security with current value X  and exercise price I,  * then the 
budget constraint (1) requires that the value of what the worker receives- 
first-period wage, WI, plus second-period guaranteed payment, 2wl, plus 
the call option C[E(mz),  2wl]-equals  the present value of his human cap- 
ital. That is, 
(3)  3w1 + C[E(m2),  2w1] = PV = ml  + E(mz). 
Because the payoff to  a call option is nonnegative, C[E(mz),  2w1] 2 0 with 
equality holding if and only if pr{mz  > 2wl)  = 0. It follows, therefore, 
that w1 < PV/3 unless pr{m > 2[m1 + E(mz)]/3} = 0. 
8. In the special case assumed by Diamond and Mirrlees of risk-neutral security pricing 
and a zero interest rate, X = E(3  wherezis  the random variable value of the security at the 
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Armed with this description, the following comparative statics results 
follow directly from budget constraint (3):  If we hold fixed the distribu- 
tion of m2 -  E(m2),  then by the implicit function theorem, we have that 
(4)  dE(m2)  dWl  =  [1-2c]/[3+22K]. 
As is well known for call option valuations, 0 5  W/dX s  1 and 0 2 
aC/aZ 2 -  1. Hence, dwl/dE(mz) 2  0 with strict equality holding only if 
pr(m2 < 2wl) = 0. Thus, ceteris paribus, a higher expected second-peri- 
od marginal product leads to a higher current wage and a higher second- 
period “guaranteed” wage floor. 
Consider instead a “mean-preserving” spread on m2,  where E(m2)  is 
held fixed and the uncertainty about the second-period wage, u,  increases. 
From (3), 
Again a well-known result for call options is that dC/&  2 0 with strict 
equality holding only if pr(rn2 > 2wl) = 1 or 0. Thus, the greater the un- 
certainty about the worker’s second-period marginal product, the smaller 
is the current wage and the lower is the second-period wage floor. It fol- 
lows immediately that the amount of risk borne by the worker increases 
the greater the uncertainty about his future marginal product. 
Although  pursued  no further  here,  the known  relations  for option 
prices can be used to derive other comparative statics results. It should be 
noted that the applied properties for option prices do not depend on the 
assumptions of risk-neutral pricing of securities in the capital markets or a 
zero interest rate. Hence, relaxing these assumptions will not affect the 
basic comparative statics results, although the existence of a positive risk- 
return trade-off may alter somewhat the structure of the optimal contract. 
A put option gives its owner the right to sell a security at a specified ex- 
ercise price on a specified date. The payoff to a put option on its expira- 
tion date is given by max (0, I -  X),  where lis  the exercise price and Xis 
the price of the security on that date. The standard functional description 
of a put option is that of insurance because the purchase of a put protects 
the owner of the underlying security against losses (in value) below the 
specified floor I. To see this insurance feature of the optimal contract, I 
rewrite (2) as 
(2”)  W(m2)  = m2  + max(0,2wl - mz). 
Hence, the optimal contract provides the worker with a put option or in- 
surance on the future wage he would otherwise earn if the labor market 
were simply a spot market. Of course, the worker pays for this insurance 
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(6)  WI = ml  -  P[E(m),  2~11, 
where P(X,  I)  is the value of a put option with an exercise price of I on a 
security with current value X.  Although (6) follows directly from (3) by 
the parity theorem for option  price^,^ expressing the budget constraint in 
the form of (6) makes more apparent the result that the first-period wage 
w1  must always be less than the first-period marginal product ml. 
This result underscores how binding the assumed constraint of no bor- 
rowing by workers (embedded in the model by requiring b’  z 0) can be in 
the determination of the optimal feasible contract. Thus, at the extreme 
where the worker’s current marginal product ml  = 0, the worker’s current 
wage  w1  = 0, and moreover  he can obtain no insurance for his future 
earnings. This is so no matter how large is the worker’s future expected 
productivity E(mz).  In a richer model where the worker can influence his 
current and future marginal products through training or choice of career 
path, it is readily apparent that the no-borrowing constraint (which is cen- 
tral to the model here) will cause severe distortions of the optimal labor 
force configuration. That is, with this constraint,  workers achieve sub- 
stantial benefits in terms of both the level of early life consumption and 
the reduction of risk surrounding later life consumption by choosing a  job 
pattern with relatively high early life marginal product ml even at the ex- 
pense of a large reduction in expected future marginal product, E(mz). 
3. 
and Endogenous Mobility 
In the  Harris-Holmstrom type  model  where  the worker’s  marginal 
product is the same for all firms, the worker will never change employers 
in equilibrium and transferable  pensions play no role in intermediating 
the risk of human capital. However, if the worker must change employers 
for exogenous reasons, or if the worker can have different marginal prod- 
ucts at different firms, then the worker  may move in equilibrium.  Al- 
though Diamond and Mirrlees discuss the cases of  exogenous and endog- 
enous mobility separately, the discussion here combines these cases in a 
single model. 
As with the mobility-threat analysis, Diamond and Mirrlees derive the 
optimal contract under the condition that the firm can offer a transferable 
pension b’ if  the employee moves and a total compensation floor if the 
employee stays. If the worker is forced to move (“exogenous mobility”), 
then he receives m ’ + b’ . The probability of such a move, p, is given ex- 
ogenously. Otherwise, the worker will move only if his total compensation 
at the new firm, mi. + b’,  exceeds that offered by his original employer. 
Optimal Labor Contracts Viewed as Options: Exogenous 
9. See Smith (1976) or Mason and Merton (1984) for proof of the theorem by arbitrage. 
In the special case of a zero interest rate, the theorem requires that C(X,  I) = X -  Z  + P(X, 
I). 349  Insurance Aspects of Pensions 
Although not stated explicitly, Diamond and Mirrlees make an impor- 
tant assumption about the structure of the labor market. In the initial pe- 
riod, all firms compete equally to hire the services of  the (unattached) 
worker. In the second-period compensation negotiations,  Diamond and 
Mirrlees assume an asymmetry between the worker’s current employer 
and all other potential employers which gives the worker’s current em- 
ployer an advantage. They postulate those firms which attempt to hire a 
worker away from his original firm must pay a wage equal to his full mar- 
ginal product mi  whereas the current employer need only match the total 
compensation provided to the worker for moving, mi + b’ ,  to  induce the 
worker to stay. Since the transferable pension (if any) b’ is a “sunk” cost 
which the firm will have to pay if  the employee moves, the current em- 
ployer derives a benefit from this monopsony power equal to (mz  - mi), 
which is nonnegative whenever it is optimal for the worker to remain with 
his original employer. 
As in the discussion of the mobility threat case in the previous section, I 
begin with an analysis of the worker’s situation when there are no restric- 
tions on contracts. In the absence of monopsony power, the present value 
of the worker’s human capital is given by 
(7)  WI = m‘  + pE(m’)  + (1 -  p)E[max(m~,  mi)]. 
As before, the unrestricted optimal contract is riskless to  the worker with 
WI  = Wd3,  wz = W1/3, and b = b’ = W1/3;  and in return the original 
employer receives the worker’s marginal product whether he moves or 
not. Introduction of the Diamond-Mirrlees asymmetry assumption might 
seem to lower the present value of the worker’s human capital to  equal ml 
+ pE(m’)  + (1 -  p)E(mi).  However, because firms are competitive in 
the initial period, they must pay for this right to “exploit” the worker in 
the second period. That is, they will pay the worker a “signing bonus” given 
by 
(8)  (1 -  p)E[max (m2,  mi) -  mi]  = (1 -  p)E[max(O, m2 -  mi)]. 
By inspection of (8), max (0, m2 -  mi] is the payoff to a call option on a 
payment of m2 -  mi  with a zero exercise price, and we denote its price by 
C[E(rn2 - mi), 01.  (Note: Unlike the “usual case” of a call option on a 
limited liability instrument, C[E(rn2 -  mi), 01  > max [0, E(m2 -  mi)] if 
the pr{m2 > mi} > 0. Hence, even if the expected future marginal prod- 
uct of the worker with his current employer, E(m2),  is less than or equal to 
his expected future marginal product elsewhere, E(m  i), the signing bonus 
will be positive.) In the Harris-Holmstrom case, where m2 = mi, there is 
no value to the firm of obtaining this second-period monopsony power, 
and hence its assumption has no influence on the analysis of the mobility 
threat case. 
As Diamond and Mirrlees show, when the worker’s second-period earn- 
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post at the end of the second period, the optimal labor contract calls for a 
transferable pension given by b’Q) = max (0, 2w1 -  y) if  the worker 
moves and a compensation package equal to max (2wl, m2) if the worker 
stays with his original employer. If the worker is not forced to move, then 
this contract leads to the worker’s staying with his current employer if and 
onlyif m2 2  mi. 
The worker’s second- (and retirement) period compensation is given by 
(9)  WQ)  = y + max (0,2w1 -  y), 
which in terms of structure is the same as the Harris-Holmstrom case (2”). 
However, in (9), y = m ’ if the worker is forced to move andy = mi  other- 
wise. From (9), it would appear that, from the worker’s perspective, his 
second-period compensation does not depend on his second-period mar- 
ginal product with his original employer, m2. This is true in the ex post 
sense of the uncertainties surrounding y, given the wage floor, 2w1.  How- 
ever, the ex ante distributional characteristics of in2 do affect W(y)  be- 
cause they affect the first-period wage and hence the second-period wage 
floor. 
To determine the first-period wage wI,  equate the value that the firm re- 
ceives in return for the contract (i.e., the worker’s first-period marginal 
product plus the right to exploit the worker in the second period) to the 
cost of the contract (i.e., the worker’s first-period wage plus the insurance 
provided by  the transferable pension and the wage floor). Expressed in 
terms of the option value equivalent of the contract, we have that 
wI  = m1 + (1 -  p)C[E(mz -  mi), 01 
(10) 
-  pP[E(m’), 2w11 -  (1 -  p)P[E(mi), 2~11. 
By inspection, the distributional characteristics of m2  (and not just its ex- 
pected value) affect the first-period wage through their influence on the 
call option price, which reflects the value of the signing bonus. 
Comparative statics results along the lines of the previous section can 
be computed from (10). I do so here only with respect to the effect of a 
change in p as the means of providing a few comments on the Diamond- 
Mirrlees exogenous mobility model presented in their section 11.3. From 
(lo), we have that 
sign -  = sign{P[E(mi), 2wl]  (2) 
-  P[E(m‘), 2wl] - C[E(m2 -  mi), 01). 
In the case of  exogenous mobility alone (i.e.,  m2 = mi), the sign of 
dwddp depends on the value of a put option on the worker’s marginal 
product when he is forced to move, m  I,  relative to the value of a put op- 
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either stay or move, mi.  Although it is, of course, conceivable for m ’ to 
have a more favorable distribution than m2  or mi,  it would appear to  be a 
rather strained definition of a forced or exogenous move if the worker re- 
ceives a wage m ‘ in excess of what he would have earned otherwise. This 
belief is further reinforced by the model’s assumption that among all the 
firms that might offer the worker a job in the nonforced case, the best of- 
fer will be a wage equal to the one available from the worker’s current em- 
ployer. Moreover, if, as Diamond and Mirrlees at one point assume, the 
exogenous move is the result of a disability, then the case for m‘ < m2 
would seem especially compelling. 
If one postulates that m ’ < mi,  then, the value of the put option insur- 
ance on m’ is greater than the value of  the corresponding insurance on 
mi. From (11),  we have unambiguously that dwl/dp< 0. That is, if the 
probability  of ending up in the disadvantaged state of being forced to 
leave your current employer increases, then the worker must (and is will- 
ing to) pay more to insure against the lost income in this state by accepting 
both a lower first-period wage and a lower floor on guaranteed compensa- 
tion. 
Making this incremental assumption also provides some insight into 
Diamond and Mirrlees’s proposition  1, which provides sufficient condi- 
tions for the optimal transferable pension, b’ ,  to be positive. By assuming 
that m2 < [ml + (1 -  p)E(m2)]/3/2  -  p)  for all m2, they ensure that m2 
< 2wl,  the equilibrium wage floor. Hence, in the event of no forced move, 
the put option on m2 will always be exercised and the worker receives a 
guaranteed second-period wage with no uncertainty. If the transferable 
pension is restricted to  be a constant, then the budget constraint is 
(12)  WI  = ml  -  pb’ -  (1 -  p)[2w1  -  E(m2)l 
because P[E(m2),  2wl] = 2wl -  E(m2)  in this case. From (12), if b‘ = 0, 
then 2w1 = [ml  + (1 -  p)E(m2)]/[3/2  -  p],  which, by hypothesis, strictly 
exceeds the maximum possible marginal product to be earned in period 2. 
Thus, it pays to transfer at least the residual value to a transferable pen- 
sion, which reduces the risk of lost income when forced to move. 
By dispensing with the requirement that b ‘ > 0 be a constant and posi- 
tive for all possible m ‘ and assuming that m ’ < m2,  the role for a transfer- 
able pension is established without the extreme conditions of proposition 1. 
Although Diamond and Mirrlees examine a variety of other cases where 
various marginal products are or are not observable, I have focused exclu- 
sively on the case where the transferable pension can be made a function 
of the ex post second-period earnings of the worker and the wage floor 
provided to the worker, if he stays, is a constant. This choice was not arbi- 
trary. This case surely establishes a nontrivial role for private pensions as a 
means of reducing risk to workers. The derived rules for the transferable 
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Thus, while the level of the floor and maximum transferable pension de- 
pend on the symmetry of the worker’s utility function to be a true opti- 
mum, they do  not depend on the specific form of the worker’s utility func- 
tion, which some of their other derived rules do. Having the transferable 
pension benefit depend on ex post earnings seems to be a practical possi- 
bility. By inspection of income tax returns, the pension-paying firm could 
verify the later year earnings for computing pension benefits. Although 
there is in principle an incentive for the worker to cheat by hiding his in- 
come, this possibility would not appear to be serious because it is difficult 
for workers to avoid declaring wages or benefits reported on W-2 forms. 
Moreover, to do so would require that the worker cheat on his federal in- 
come taxes and thereby expose himself to those penalties as well. The de- 
rived plan has the further virtue of not requiring the pension-paying firm 
to distinguish between involuntary moves (e.g., disability) and voluntary 
moves. 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
The Diamond and Mirrlees analysis should stimulate much-needed ad- 
ditional research into the role of pensions when there are significant labor 
market imperfections. Although their model is almost too simple, many 
of their assumptions can be relaxed without seriously affecting their basic 
conclusions. I applaud their attempt to bring institutional and legal con- 
straints into the discussion of feasible contracts for their model. 
Perhaps with a bit of irony, such real world legal constraints may rule 
out their assumption that the firm can “exploit” its current employees by 
paying them m’ + b’ when m2  > mi. If, for example, m2  > mi > 2wl, 
then it is likely that the firm will be hiring new workers in addition to their 
current labor force. Since by their other assumption firms must pay new 
workers their full marginal product, it is not clear that it would stand a le- 
gal test for the firm to pay “new” workers (who are otherwise the same) 
more than “old” workers. The sensitivity of their contract schemes to this 
issue warrants further study. 
Diamond and Mirrlees raise the important issue of the firm’s defaulting 
on its labor contracts. The manifest impact of  such a default is that the 
workers may not be paid the transferable pension and “wage floor’’ bene- 
fits promised in both the explicit and implicit parts of the labor contract. 
If workers fully recognize this possibility ex ante, when the contract is ne- 
gotiated, they will receive compensation for this risk in the form of either 
a higher first-period wage or larger promised future benefits. Even in this 
case, however, it is  straightforward to show that the workers’ expected 
utility will fall relative to  the case where such defaults are ruled out. If, as 
would seem reasonable, the fortunes of  the firm and the future marginal 
product of its workers are strongly positively correlated, it is more likely 
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needs the promised benefits. Thus, the utility loss from the possibility of 
default could be substantial. 
There is another-perhaps  latent-impact  of default that may signifi- 
cantly limit the magnitude and duration of  the future promised benefits 
component  of  labor  contracts.  Bankruptcy is,  of  course, bad  for the 
firm-but  it is less bad than if the owners (shareholders) were required to 
contribute additional sums to the firm in order that it could fulfill its obli- 
gation and avoid bankruptcy. As has been shown in the finance literature, 
it is not the shareholders who lose in a bankruptcy, but the other liability- 
holders who are not paid what they are promised. From this follows the 
well-known result that if the riskiness of the firm’s assets increases, then 
there will  be a transfer  of  value from the current nonequity  liability- 
holders to the stockholders, and this occurs even if such an increase has no 
effect on the overall market value of the firm. Thus, the managers  of 
limited liability firms have an incentive to increase the riskiness of their as- 
sets (even if there is no compensating higher expected return on the as- 
sets).  lo In the Diamond-Mirrlees context, the workers are explicit non- 
equity liabilityholders of  the firm with  respect to their vested  pension 
benefits and implicit liabilityholders with respect to the firm’s promise of 
a floor on future wages. Hence, they face a potential moral hazard prob- 
lem with respect to the firm not unlike the one that rules out or severely 
limits the sale of their own human capital. 
Since the potential for gain to the stockholders from such a “liability- 
induced” shift in the risk of  the firm’s assets is an increasing function of 
both the size and the maturity of the nonequity liabilities, the moral haz- 
ard problem can be reduced by limiting the magnitude of the liabilities 
and making them of  relatively short duration. For explicit corporate lia- 
bilities, the problem is further reduced by the introduction of indenture 
restrictions that limit the types of investments the firm can make without 
the liabilityholders’ approval. A relevant example is a corporate pension 
plan that requires that a specified portion of the firm’s  assets be segre- 
gated in a pension fund; gives the pension liabilityholders first claim on 
these assets; and sets guidelines for the types of assets held in the fund. 
Thus, with the possibility of default, optimal labor contracts will have a 
smaller proportion of total compensation in the form of promised future 
benefits  than  would  be  predicted  by  the  Diamond-Mirrlees  analysis. 
Moreover, the relative proportion of  explicit to implicit contract benefits 
will also be larger, which suggests that vested and transferable pensions 
may have an even more important role in improving the risk-bearing op- 
portunities for workers. 
10. Thus, even if all securities and assets are priced in a risk-neutral fashion, the presence 
of  bankruptcy possibililties may induce what appears to be “risk-loving-like” behavior on 
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If the moral hazard problem surrounding default by the firm can be ne- 
glected, then the manifest impact of bankruptcy can be formally integrated 
into the current Diamond-Mirrlees  model by recognizing that the work- 
ers, as part of the implicit labor contract, grant a put option to the firm 
with an exercise price equal to the total promised second-period benefits. 
In the case of default on pension benefits, which are a legal liability of 
the firm, the firm would face actual bankruptcy and the underlying secur- 
ity for the put option would be the firm’s assets. In the (perhaps more in- 
teresting)  case  of  default  on implicitly  contracted wage  floors,  there 
would be no formal bankruptcy.  While it is not always clear what the un- 
derlying security for the put is in this case, I would agree with Diamond 
and Mirrlees that it is probably the value of the intangible asset called 
“reputation” lost by the firm when it does not meet its implicit contract 
obligations. Such an analysis might also explain why some firms when 
facing hard times choose to employ all their long-term workers part time 
instead of firing some workers and keeping others full time. In effect, like 
bondholders in a single debt issue, partial employment permits all workers 
with defaulted implicit claims to share what amount is available, whereas 
full employment  of some and no employment for others would be the 
equivalent in a regular bankruptcy of randomly paying some bondholders 
full face value and others nothing at all. Using the established results from 
option pricing, one could perhaps identify the type of firms (e.g.,  by risk 
characteristics) in which implicit labor contracts with floors are likely to 
be important. 
Finally, I would note that the derived payoff structure to the transfer- 
able pension benefit, 6’ = max (0,2w1 -  y),  looks remarkably similar to 
the structure of a defined benefit private pension plan that is integrated 
with social security.  ‘I In effect, the Diamond-Mirrlees pension benefit is 
equivalent to a defined benefit plan integrated with other private plans in- 
stead of social security. Since they derive this structure as the solution of 
an optimal plan, it may be possible to  derive similar normative properties, 
heretofore unrecognized, for integrated pension plans. 
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